1 may be reluctant to exercise the legal mobility option if his or her employer has sponsored him or her for permanent residence (a green card), because during most of the lengthy application period the worker cannot change employers without beginning the application process anew.
4
I use the National Surveys of College Graduates (NSCG) cross-sections from 2003, 2010, 2013 and 2015 to examine the job changing behavior of skilled temporary work visa holders. The NSCG is among the very few microdata sets containing information on visa status, though it does not distinguish among types of temporary work visa. In each survey, the NSCG asks whether respondents had changed employer in a recent two-year window, and if so, for what reasons. In my first approach, I restrict the sample to workers whose first visa on arrival in the United States was a temporary work visa, and I test whether voluntary job changing is higher for those who recently obtained a green card.
The presence of such a spike would suggest that the workers had not been able to move as much as desired while on the temporary visa. To assess the mobility of temporary work visa holders more generally, I also compare the voluntary job changing rate of those who entered the United States on a temporary work visa, and still hold such a visa, with that of natives or immigrants who entered on a green card.
My study complements that of Depew, Norlander and Sørensen (2017) , who examine microdata from six Indian IT firms for 2003-2011 to study job changes within the United States and returns to India.
5 Though their data are superior to mine in several respects, including capturing workers with short stays in the United States, mine represent a more general population of workers with medium or long-term stays, and allow a comparison with natives. The authors conclude that many of the workers on temporary work visas soon return to India, and that many others quit for other firms in the United States, with the rates of both actions sensitive to salary and the unemployment rate. Of workers who began U.S. employment spells in 2003-2005, 36% had quit by 2011, apparently for 4 An L-1 worker who might otherwise be considering changing employer by obtaining an H-1B visa may be reluctant to move for the same reason.
5 Nairu et al. (2015) study firm monopsony power over immigrants in the United Arab Emirates.
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another firm in the United States, 50% had returned to India, while 14% remained with the original firm in the United States, apparently having been able to apply for or receive a green card.
My results suggest that temporary work visa holders are constrained in their voluntary job changing behavior only to the extent that they stay with an employer sponsoring them for a green card. For such workers, who represent a minority of skilled workers who enter the United States on temporary visas, the two-year mobility rate spikes by 4.7 percentage points after green card receipt, compared to a 11.6% mobility rate for all workers who entered on temporary work visas. This implies a 20% reduction in mobility during the application period given an approximately four-year waiting period. There is no spike in moves associated exclusively with pay and promotion and/or working conditions, nor with moves unrelated to pay and promotion and/or working conditions. The spike is rather in moves associated with pay and promotion and/or working conditions and at least one other moving reason. Such moves may represent cases where pay and promotion and working conditions are less different across the mover's options than in moves associated with pay and promotion and/or working conditions only. If so, the results suggest that while some green card applicants pay a monopsony-related temporary price in professional terms for permanent access to the U.S. labor market, applicants leave the sponsoring employer if the professional price is too high.
By contrast, the voluntary job changing rate for workers who entered the United States on a temporary work visa and still hold such a visa is similar to that of both immigrants who entered with a green card and natives with similar characteristics. Together, the results therefore alleviate concerns that temporary work visa holders are exploited by monopsonistic employers, though our data are unsuitable for a direct analysis of wages, as only the post-move wage is available. If policy-makers nevertheless wish to increase the mobility of green card applicants, the logical reforms would be to the green card system rather than to the temporary work visa regulations, for example increasing the number of employment-based green cards or separating the application process from the employer. It is unclear what the effect would be of lifting the per country limits on (total) green cards (Argueta 2016) .
Temporary work visas and mobility restrictions
The survey data I use do not distinguish among the types of temporary work visa held by respondents, and there are no administrative data on the stock of people on temporary visas in the United States. Administrative data on inflows by visa type are published, and I show the inflows for visas likely to be held by workers with a college degree or more in The fact that some workers approved for visas by USCIS do not follow through and obtain one from the Department of State seems insufficient to explain the discrepancy.
The next most common set of visas is for traders and investors from countries with which the United States has a trade treaty (13% for E-1 and E-2); professionals from such countries (E-3, E-3R, TN and H1-B1) account for a further 6% of visas (this category grew quickly from 2005 to 2015). Another category of skilled visas is the subset of J-1 visas for professors and research scholars (I have omitted the subset for short-term scholars):
these make up 9% of new skilled work visas. Finally, the O-1 category for workers of extraordinary ability, which includes artists, entertainers and athletes in addition to more conventional workers, accounts for about 4%.
H-1B workers must have a bachelor's degree or equivalent. 7 The number of H-1B visas is capped for for-profit employers, though uncapped for non-profit employers, and in some years a lottery is held to apportion the capped visas.
8 An H-1B visa is initially issued for three years, and may be extended for another three. If a worker's employer takes the first steps towards obtaining the worker permanent residence (a green card) in a timely manner, the H-1B visa remains valid until a decision on the green card is made and a green card becomes available.
H-1B visa holders are heterogeneous and stay for varying lengths of time. They are employed disproportionately in information technology services (as shown in the administrative data on inflows): a common new recipient of an H-1B is an Indian computer programmer working for an Indian company. 9 H-1B employees of the large India-based IT firm studied by Clemens (2010 Clemens ( , 2013 had contracts for work in the United States of 6-15 months, while the most common U.S. tenure for workers in the six Indian firms studied by Depew et al. (2017) was about six months. Other H-1B holders stay longer in the United States, some of them adjusting their status to permanent resident. However, Hira (2010b) shows that only a small minority of those entering on an H-1B visa (or an L-1 visa) are sponsored for a green card by their original employer: at least seven of the top 15 employers of H-1B workers sponsored five percent or fewer, and five of the top six employers of L-1 workers sponsored five percent or fewer.
10
An H-1B worker may change employers as soon as the prospective new employer has petitioned USCIS to have the visa transfered from the existing employer, without waiting 7 Requirements for all temporary visas are described at https://www.uscis.gov/working-unitedstates/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers, accessed 26 August 2016.
8 There are some exceptions to this characterization of which employers are subject to the cap. For example, K-12 schools are subject to the cap. http://www.computerworld.com/article/2954612/it-outsourcing/despite-h-1b-lottery-offshorefirms-dominate-visa-use.html.
10 Hira updates his numbers to 2014 at http://www.epi.org/blog/top-h-1b-employers-use-visa-programfor-temporary-labor-not-as-bridge-to-permanent-immigration/, accessed 3 May 2017.
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for the petition to be approved.
11 From 2006 From -2014 A different issue is that the prospect of a green card may make the worker want to stay with the same employer, since changing employer means starting the lengthy application process anew. Although workers may change employer while waiting for the last step of the green card application to be processed (the I-485), for many applicants the lengthiest part of the application is waiting for a visa to become available after being approved in principle. Only then may the I-485 be filed. Jasso et al. (2010) report that in 2003, the average elapsed time between application and receipt of an employment-based green card was 4.3 years. Indian and Chinese workers have particularly long waits, because the delay 11 See https://www.uscis.gov/tools/ombudsman-liaison/practical-immigration-consequences-foreignworkers-slowing-economy, accessed 9 May, 2016. However, workers who enter the U.S. on an H-1B visa with an uncapped employer must enter the lottery for capped visas if they wish to transfer to an employer subject to the cap.
12 Numbers from the annual reports on H-1B petitions at https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reportsstudies/reports-and-studies.
13 Banerjee (2006) ; https://www.revealnews.org/reports/job-brokers-steal-wages-entrap-indian-techworkers-in-us/, https://www.revealnews.org/reports/case-study-tata-consultancy-services/, accessed 3 May 2017.
arises from equal limits for each country on the annual number of green cards that may be awarded.
14 In the popular perception, this green-card related constraint on mobility sometimes appears to be construed as a general constraint affecting all H-1B workers. A series of questions elicits the current status. All respondents are asked whether they are a U.S. citizen, and those who answer yes are asked if they are a naturalized US citizen. Those who answer no are asked if they are a permanent resident, and if so, the year permanent residence (the green card) was obtained. Those who answer that they are not a permanent resident are asked which of the temporary visa types listed above they 8 hold.
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Another set of questions allows me to measure workers' job mobility. All respondents are asked whether they were employed for pay or profit on both of two dates, one shortly before the survey, and one approximately two years earlier.
Those respondents who were employed on both dates are asked whether they worked for the same employer and in the same "job". Those who changed jobs or employers or both are offered a set of possible reasons for the change, of which more than one may be chosen.
Using these questions, I construct a dummy for a voluntary change of employer for a sample of workers employed at both dates. A worker is considered to have made a voluntary change of employer if he or she reports having changed employers, if he or she does not mention layoff as a reason, and if he or she does not give retirement or "other"
as the sole reason. I include in the sample those who appear to have switched to selfemployment (as evidenced by their reporting being self-employed in the survey week).
The results are not sensitive to their inclusion.
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I also construct dummies for having received a green card in the year prior to the survey reference date and two, three and four years prior (an immigrant must hold a green card for five years before being eligible for U.S. citizenship). The job mobility windows do not begin or end at the beginning or end of calendar years in any survey, whereas the date of receipt of the green card is a calendar year, so the timing of green card receipt with respect to the window contains considerable noise; in any case, the ideal timing (how long respondents would take to move after receiving a green card) is not obvious. The Data Appendix gives the exact definitions.
I use both the full sample of workers employed in both periods, and a subsample of immigrant workers who entered the United States on a temporary work visa. The youngest respondents are aged 23, and I restrict the samples to those age 64 or younger. I drop immigrants who appear to have moved to the United States during the job mobility window (see the Data Appendix). Table 2 presents the unweighted means of the variables used for both samples. Because those successful in obtaining a green card may differ unobservably from those who do not obtain one, I control for whether the respondent currently holds a green card or is naturalized (one must hold a green card for five years to be eligible for citizenship).
This means that any spike in mobility on the part of recent green card recipients is relative to the mobility of respondents who received a green card longer ago, not relative to those still on a temporary visa.
I define T G it as a dummy equal to one if the worker who entered on a temporary work visa received a green card in year t, and estimate the linear probability of voluntarily changing employer in the window spanning approximately t − 2 to t:
where V is a set of dummies for the worker's current visa status, including green card and naturalized citizen, and a dummy for having received a green card in 2000-2015 (since having received a green card shortly before any of the surveys implies having received it in these calendar years). The cross-section nature of the data restricts the covariates X to refer to the current period, and they include years since highest degree and its square; age and years since migration; highest degree and field of study of highest degree; as well as dummies for gender, marital status, their interaction, presence of a child aged under two, 2-5, 6-11, 12-18, or over eighteen, and their interaction with gender. Arrival year cohort dummies are always jointly insignificant and are not included.
The coefficients of interest are β 1 , β 2 , β 3 and β 4 . β 1 may capture not only respondents who received a green card in the middle of the mobility window and are then very likely to move before the end of the window, but respondents who received their green card close enough to the end of the mobility window that they are particularly unlikely to move over the window if tied to their employer. This means that any spike may show up in a positive β 2 rather than a positive β 1 . By three to four years after green card receipt, any spike should have subsided, which I check by examining β 3 and β 4 . The patterns related to recent receipt of a green card are sensitive to weighting; the Data Appendix explains why I prefer unweighted regressions.
I also seek to establish the degree to which any spike is caused by moves for pay and promotion or working conditions reasons: an important role for such moves would indicate possible use of monopsony power by employers. In order to do this, I estimate equation
(1) separately for the probability of voluntary job changes for the three mutually exclusive sets of reasons: moves for pay and promotion and/or working conditions, but no other reason; moves for pay and promotion and/or working conditions, and an additional reason or reasons; and moves for reasons that include neither pay and promotion nor working conditions. If firms make strong use of their monopsony power, I expect to find a spike in moving for both the first and second set of reasons. If firms make weak use of their monopsony power, I expect a spike in moving for the second but not the first set of reasons, assuming that moves in the second set represent situations where pay and promotion and working conditions are less different across the mover's options than for moves in the first set. If firms make no use of their monopsony power or have no monopsony power, there should be no spike in the first two sets of reasons, but there could be a spike in the third set of reasons.
To examine more general barriers to mobility, I pool all workers in the data, and include dummies allowing different groups of immigrants to be compared with natives (the omitted group). The voluntary job mobility rate of those who entered on a temporary work visa and who currently hold the same type of visa (T T ) is of particular interest. In principle, I am also interested in the mobility while on a temporary work visa of workers who entered on a student visa, but I cannot determine whether such workers already had a temporary work visa at the start of the mobility window. I also include dummies for those who entered on a temporary work visa and have obtained a green card in various recent years (T G) or obtained a green card more than four years prior to the survey (T G t−5+ );
for those who entered on a green card and therefore still have permanent status whether on a green card or as a naturalized citizen (GG) and other combinations of entry and current visa (V V ). I estimate the linear probability regression
The coefficient γ 1 indicates whether temporary work visa holders (who entered on a temporary work visa) are less mobile than natives; these immigrants may also be compared to immigrants who entered on a green card by computing γ 1 − γ 2 . The coefficients γ 3 and γ 4 capture any spike associated with obtaining a green card relative to natives rather than other former temporary work visa holders as in equation (1). Subtracting γ 7 from these coefficients should yield a spike effect close to that of equation (1), though not exactly the same, given that in equation (2) the coefficients on X (γ 9 ) are constrained to be the same for natives and all immigrants, and that the comparison is of recent to earlier green card recipients regardless of the pre-green card visa if any. As with the estimation of equation (1), I also examine the probability of changing employer for different sets of reasons to assess the likelihood of monopsony power.
There is some bias introduced to the estimation of equation (2) The motivation for studying job mobility is that constraints may lower the wages of temporary visa holders. Unfortunately, the cross-section nature of the data preclude study of the effects of constrained mobility on wages or salaries.
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4 Descriptive statistics Table 3 summarizes (unweighted) voluntary job changing for different groups. The first row shows the overall voluntary job changing rate, which for the full sample is 13.2%
(column 1). The 13.4% rate for natives (column 2) is very similar to the 13.1% rate for those who entered on a temporary work visa and still hold such a visa (column 7).The highest rate is for workers who entered on a temporary work visa and received their green card two years prior to the survey (20.6% in column 9). These raw numbers suggest that workers on temporary visas are indeed able to change jobs, but suggest that workers who eventually get a green card may be tied to their employer and wait to change employer until after they receive a green card. Table 3 also shows voluntary mobility rates for different groups distinguished by the 17 A subsample of the 2003 NSCG respondents was followed for some years, but contained only science and engineering workers. The representative subsample common to the 2010 and 2013 surveys is too small to be useful.
(not mutually exclusive) reasons given for the job move. Pay and promotion opportunities is the most commonly cited reason for every group, followed by working conditions. Few voluntary movers say they moved for "other" reasons. These statistics obscure the fact that a majority of voluntary movers gives more than one reason for moving: the share giving a single reason is 27% in the full sample and 30% for workers who entered on a temporary work visa. Certain reasons are commonly given together. 73-77% of voluntary movers citing work conditions as a reason also cited pay and promotion as a reason, while 48-61% of respondents citing pay and promotion as a reason also cited work conditions. 61-69% of movers citing family also cited job location, while 32-35% of movers citing job location also cited family.
The bottom panel of Table 3 therefore shows mobility rates for the three mutually exclusive sets of reasons for moving. The most common set of reasons is that encompassing both pay and promotion and/or working conditions as well as at least one additional reason, a type of move made by 7.2% of the full sample (column 1). This type of mobility is particularly high for workers who received a green card two years prior to the survey (12.5%, column 9), and slightly low for workers who entered on a temporary work visa and still hold it (6.5% in column 7). It is high for holders of temporary work visas in column 5 (9.1%), but the workers in this sample who are absent from column 7 are likely to have changed visa type during the mobility window (for example, from a student visa).
Differences across groups are more muted for the two other sets of reasons (related to pay and promotion and working conditions only and unrelated to pay and promotion or working conditions).
Results
I next turn to regression analysis, first using the sample of workers who entered on a temporary visa to investigate whether there is a spike in voluntary job changing for workers initially on temporary visas who receive a green card, before comparing the voluntary job changing rates of several immigrant groups with that of natives. Table 4 presents linear probability regressions controlling for dummies for recent receipt of a green card, receipt of a green card in 2000-2015, current visa, American citizens born abroad and survey year. The latter covariates capture, among other things, the fact that the job mobility windows differ in length across surveys. The coefficients of interest are those on recent green card receipt. In column 1, whose specification includes no other covariates, the recent green card coefficients indicate no spike for those who received their green card in the prior year, perhaps indicating that it takes a worker more than a year to find a new job and move. A spike of 9.1 percentage points appears after two years, before subsiding to about 3.5 percentage points in the third and fourth years. Since young and inexperienced workers change jobs more frequently, I control in column 2 for years since highest degree and its square, and age and years since migration. This reduces the size of the two-year spike to 4.8 percentage points, while the coefficients on receipt of green card three and four years prior decline to statistical insignificance. Adding dummies for highest degree and field of study of highest degree (column 3) and gender, being married, their interaction, the presence of children and their interaction with gender (column 4) makes little difference.
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Workers entering on temporary visas
Because Indians and Chinese have to wait a particularly long time for their green cards to become available, one would expect the spike to be more marked for them. However, unreported regressions based on the specification in column 4 show that the sample is not large enough to distinguish between groups based on birth place. Likewise, unreported results fail to distinguish between men and women.
In column 5, I present results based on the 2015 survey alone. This indicates a larger two-year spike of 9.5 percentage points (albeit significant only at the 10% level), as well as a dip in mobility after one year: a large 12.9 percentage points. Differences in coefficients from the full sample are not statistically significantly different, but it is possible either that effects have changed with time or that the timing of the 2015 survey and the mobility window better capture changes in mobility. I thus view the 9.5 percentage point spike as an upper bound to an effect that may be attenuated by noise in other years.
It is useful to put the size of the estimated spike in context by making a crude calculation of the implied reduced mobility during the application period. A spike in the two-year mobility rate of 4.7 percentage points (column 4) compares with an average two-year mobility rate of 11.6%, and is in response to lower mobility over the average wait for the green card of about four years. This means two-year mobility is depressed in the application period by about 2.35 percentage points or 20%. If we focus on the imprecise 2015 results, the spike is 9.5 percentage points compared to a mobility rate of 14.1%, which implies a 34% reduction in mobility.
In Table 5 , I use the sets of reasons movers give to assess the roles of pay and promotion and work conditions in the mobility spike. If mobility is reduced for reasons related to pay and promotion or working conditions, it suggests that employers are using their monopsony power over temporary work visa holders. In Panel A, I repeat the results from Table 4 
All workers
The second approach is to compare current temporary visa holders (who entered on a temporary visa) to natives or to current green card holders using the full sample of workers. This captures any immobility of those immigrants waiting for a green card as well as temporary visa holders facing other mobility barriers. The approach also allows a comparison of the mobility rates of recent green card holders with natives (or other groups), rather than current temporary visa holders. All regressions include dummies for survey year and American citizens born abroad, as well as dummies for various transitions between entry and current visa status: temporary work visa to temporary work visa; green card to green card or naturalized status; temporary work visa to green card in the prior year or two, three, four or more than four years prior to the survey; corresponding dummies for transitions from a study or training visa to a temporary work visa and other temporary visa to a green card; and uncategorized transitions. The reference group is natives. Table 6 may also be used to reassess the green card receipt spike by comparing recent green card recipients to natives rather than to former temporary work visa holders. Comparing the mobility rate of temporary visa workers who have recently received a green card two years previously with that of natives (row d), with full covariates (column 4), shows a statistically significant spike of 5.0 percentage points, similar to the 4.7 percentage point spike estimated in the previous section when the comparison was with temporary visa holders yet to obtain a green card.
In Table 7 , I probe the same sample using moving reasons to uncover any evidence of monopsony behavior that might have been masked in Table 6 . Panel A repeats the key coefficients from Table 6 : the coefficient for workers who enter on a temporary work visa and remain on such a visa, and the coefficient for workers who enter on a green card.
Panel B estimates the probability of moving for the three sets of reasons. Column 1, where natives are the reference group, suggest that temporary visa holders are more mobile by 1.0 percentage point for the set of reasons focused on pay and promotion and work conditions, contradicting the null hypothesis of lower mobility due to monopsony.
On the other hand, temporary visa holders are less mobile by 1.2 percentage points for the set of mixed reasons (pay and promotion and/or working conditions and at least one additional reason), which supports the hypothesis. These two effects along with no effect for reasons unrelated to pay and promotion and working conditions sum to the null total effect in Panel A. Panel C shows that temporary work visa holders are more mobile for pay and promotion reasons alone, though this is a relatively unusual type of move, and no different from natives in terms of moves for working conditions only.
The coefficients in column 1 are somewhat difficult to interpret, but nevertheless do not give rise to great concern about temporary work visa holders being exploited by their employers. Indeed, as green card holders show somewhat similar patterns relative to temporary visa holders in column 2, when they are used as the comparison group instead of natives by differencing the coefficients (column 4), there are no statistically significant differences in Panel B. Temporary visa holders remain more likely by 0.7 percentage point to move for pay and promotion reasons alone (Panel C).
Conclusion
Workers who entered the United States on a temporary visa but transition to a green card (permanent residence) are reluctant to leave their employer during the green card application process, as evidenced by a spike in voluntary job changing following green card receipt. The magnitude of the spike suggests mobility is depressed in the green card application period by 20% in the preferred estimates, although estimates based on the most recent year of data suggest a reduction of about one third. The spike is in moves associated with pay and promotion and/or working conditions and at least one other moving reason. Such moves may represent cases where pay and promotion and working conditions are less different across the mover's options than in moves associated with pay and promotion and/or working conditions only, in which there is no spike. If so, the results suggest that while some green card applicants pay a monopsony-related temporary price in professional terms for permanent access to the U.S. labor market, applicants leave the sponsoring employer if the professional price is too high.
For the majority of temporary visa holders who are not sponsored for green cards, I find less binding constraints. Whether compared to similar natives or otherwise similar immigrants who entered on a green card, immigrants who enter on a temporary work visa and maintain that status have a two-year voluntary job changing rate a statistically insignificant 0.3-0.5 percentage point (2-4%) lower, compared to the two-year mobility rate for the sample of 13.2%. Together, the paper's results alleviate concerns that skilled workers on temporary visas are exploited by employers, although direct evidence on wages is not available.
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Data Appendix
A.1 Reasons for changing employer or job
The surveys ask those who reported changing employer or type of job "Why did you change your employer or your job?", with respondents checking yes or no for each of: Pay, promotion opportunities; Working conditions (e.g., hours, equipment, working environment); Job location; Change in career or professional interests; Family-related reasons (e.g., children, spouse's job moved); School-related reasons (e.g., returned to school, completed a degree); Laid off or job terminated (includes company closings, mergers, buyouts, grant or contract ended; Retired; Some other reason. 
A.2 Dummies for receipt of green card
A.4 Sensitivity of recent green card recipients' job mobility to weighting
My preferred results would in principle be those from regressions weighted using the survey weights. The NSCG sampling is stratified on demographics, highest degree, occupation and (in 2010 and 2013) field of study of bachelor's degree.
18 I do not control for all of these: for example, I do not control for race as it confounds the immigration effect, and I do not control for occupation because only movers' pre-move occupation is unknown. But the omitted occupation is likely to be correlated with the error term, making weighting desirable (Solon et al. 2015) . However, recent green card recipients are much more mobile in weighted than unweighted data. This is shown in Table A1 to be driven by a very high weighted mobility rate for women in the 2010 and 2013 surveys. This odd sensitivity to a group represented by 51 observations leads me to prefer unweighted results. NSF confirms in email correspondence that weights were determined differently in 2010 and 2013 from in 2003, though not in a way related to gender and probably not in a way related to visa status. Note: Coefficients from linear probability estimation of the probability of a voluntary change of employer. The sample in columns (1)- (4) is all immigrants who entered the U.S. on a temporary work visa and column (5) is the subsample from the 2015 survey. All regressions include dummies for sample year, born abroad as U.S. citizen, and born in a U.S. territory. "Exp" is years since highest degree. Highest degree comprises four dummies, field of study 31 dummies, children (present in the household) five dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Note: Coefficients from linear probability estimations of the probability of a voluntary change of employer for the specific reason or combination of reasons. The sample is 8710 immigrants who entered the U.S. on a temporary work visa. All regressions include the full covariates of column 4 in Table 4 . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Note: Coefficients from linear probability estimation of the probability of a voluntary change of employer on a sample of all workers. The sample in columns (1)- (4) is all workers and the subsample in column (5) is workers in the 2015 survey. All regressions include dummies for sample year, born abroad as U.S. citizen, born in a U.S. territory, immigrants with other types of temporary entry visa who currently hold a green card (for different lengths of time), and uncategorized immigrants. "Exp" is years since highest degree. Highest degree comprises four dummies, field of study 31 dummies, children (present in the household) five dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Note: Coefficients from linear probability estimation of the probability of a voluntary change of employer for the specific reason. The sample is all workers, 271,818 observations. All regressions include the covariates of Table 6 column 4. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
29
